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Introduction 
Trade has been a key driver of growth in countries that have been successful in achieving 
high rates of growth over the past 3 decades, such as those in East Asia. If they are to 
accelerate their growth, trade will have to perform the same role for ACP countries.  
Designing policies that promote trade and trade competitiveness must be at the heart of 
growth strategies for ACP countries.  
 
Economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EU could be instrumental in a 
competitiveness framework, but to do so they have to be designed carefully.  Any 
successful EPA will need to take into account critical features of the new global economy:   
•  intense new competition emanating from large developing countries such as China, 
India and Brazil;  
•  simultaneous  rapid growth of these economies opening up new dynamic market 
opportunities; 
•  explosive growth of services trade, creating new opportunities in the global market 
and offering new avenues for diversification away from primary commodities;   
•  the increasing importance of domestic institutions, policies and infrastructure in 
affecting productivity and the ability of a country’s firms to compete in 
international market.  
   
In this new global context, the EPA negotiations create an opportunity to undertake 
domestic reforms that promote access to global markets and achieving global 
competitiveness. These require reforms that (i) improve the incentive framework, (ii) 
increase access to and lower the costs of backbone services, such as telecoms, transport, 
energy and finance and (iii) address weak trade supporting institutions, including 
standards, customs, and trade promotion agencies.   “Aid for trade” associated with EPAs 
(and the multilateral discussions) can help build infrastructure and new institutions to 
  1reduce costs of trading. In addition, the most effective response to a number of the barriers 
to global competitiveness will require actions at the regional level. EPAs can play an 
important role in leveraging coherent regional reforms and in putting in place mechanisms 
that allow for coordinated development support from EU countries.  
 
However, there are risks that EPAs may fall short of these achievements. A narrow EPA 
that focuses solely on trade preferences, preferential access to the EU market for ACP 
exporters and the opening up of ACP markets just to EU firms, will be ineffectual in 
driving rapid growth since they will do nothing to leverage the domestic and regional 
reforms that are necessary to overcome the barriers that limit integration into the global 
economy. Many ACP countries have seen a very weak supply response to preferences in 
the past and this clearly will not change unless these supply constraints are ameliorated. 
 
The paper elaborates on these arguments.  A first section highlights the trade challenge that 
ACP countries face and makes the point that preferences in the past have not be effective is 
preventing the substantial decline in world market share of African countries. A second 
section describes opportunities that the new wave of globalization is opening up to ACP 
countries. A third section briefly discusses what this means in terms of a strategy to attain 
global competitiveness and suggests design features of an EPA that would complement 
and support competitiveness reform programs.  
 
The trade challenge facing ACP countries 
The trade preferences that have been granted to the ACP countries by the European 
Communities under the Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou Agreements for the last 30 years 
will expire in 2008. Negotiations for a new WTO consistent trade agreement have been 
taking place for the last 5 years. To limit the demands of negotiating agreements with each 
ACP country the EU has pursued negotiations to establish six Free Trade Areas (FTAs). 
To date, negotiations have advanced only slowly and there is considerable debate as to 
how EPAs will have to be designed and what elements and commitments they should 
contain. Before proceeding to these issues it is important to reflect upon the impact of 
current and previous EU development agreements.   
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We focus our description of past trends on Eastern and Southern Africa (the ESA-region in 
the EPA negotiations). We suspect that the trade challenge that we highlight for ESA is the 
same as that facing most of the other EPA regions. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the 
average share of global merchandise exports of the ESA countries. This share was initially 
small and is now less than half of the level of 25 years ago. The figure shows that most of 
the decline occurred in the 1980s with a leveling off in the 1990s but little subsequent 
rebound. The figure compares the performance of the average ESA country with the 
average of a group of 16 fast growing countries
1. The contrast is stark, with a rapidly rising 
share of global exports (a 3-fold increase over the past 25 years) fuelling the sustained 
growth that these countries have enjoyed. The figure highlights the importance of trade for 
the fast growing countries and the enormous potential for sustained growth of exports from 
the ESA region.  
 
Figure 2 shows a similar story for exports of services. The average ESA country has had a 
very low and declining share of the global market for services. This is in contrast to the 
fast growing countries, who have, on average, almost tripled their share of the world 
market over the past 25 years. Hence, the challenge for ESA and other ACP countries is to 
provide a trade policy climate in which to attain the sustained increases in exports of both 
 
1 This group contains non-oil exporting countries that have grown at an average annual rate of growth of 4.5 
per cent of more over the past 25 years. The averages are unweighted so that country size does not influence 
the measure. The sixteen countries are Botswana, Sri Lanka, Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mauritius, Uganda, 
Burkina Faso, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, Cambodia, Singapore, Korea, Rep., and China. 
  3goods and services and rising global market shares that have driven growth in the high 
performing countries.    
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These figures also suggest a lack of effectiveness of current and previous agreements with 
the EU in supporting sustained growth of exports or in dealing with the constraints that 
have undermined the share of ESA countries in the world market. In other words, this 
weak performance occurred despite preferential access to the EU and other markets. 
Preferences alone have not helped to strongly integrate ESA into the global economy. With 
decreasing margins of preference due to continued multilateral liberalization, they are even 
less likely to help achieving this objective in the future.  
 
There are three key reasons why preferences have not been effective in stimulating a 
significant export response in ACP countries.
2 First, preferences have not dealt with, and 
may have distracted attention away from, the key supply side constraints that limit access 
to all markets. Brenton and Hoppe (2007) find that whilst preferences for clothing have 
supported exports to the EU and US they have not overcome the negative impact of weak 
governance in Africa on the sourcing decisions of global buyers. The conclusions from a 
review of the range of diagnostic trade integration studies
3 that have been undertaken in 
least developed countries concludes that the principal constraints to trade are typically 
those that limit access to and raise the costs of the key backbone services that are critical 
                                                 
2 Olareaga and Ozden (2005) suggest that preferences may actually have hindered integration of poor 
countries into global markets, showing that those countries that received preferences tended to have 
liberalised their own trade policies less than those developing countries that had not received preferential 
access to OECD markets.  
3 See Biggs (2007) 
  4for competitiveness (transport, energy, finance, telecommunications). These problems are 
compounded by poorly designed structures of incentives that constrain the flow of 
resources into their most productive uses and weak and ineffectual trade supporting 
institutions, such as customs, standards, export promotion agencies, trade ministries 
themselves, and the often existing fragmentation of authority with regard to trade related 
issues between a number of ministries, coupled with a lack of coordination among the 
stakeholders.   
 
Second, and related, preferences margins for products currently exported by the ACP 
countries are typically small and have, and will continue, to be eroded, by multilateral 
trade liberalization and the EU’s predilection to sign free trade agreements. It should be 
pointed out that 46 percent of exports from Africa to the EU are concentrated in oil 
(products). Of the remaining non-oil exports, 58 percent enter the EU under a zero MFN 
tariff rate (this percentage is similar for both LDCs and non-LDCs). The value of 
preferences that many in individual ACP countries perceive is often far in excess of reality. 
For example, looking at the 13 non-LDCs who may lose some of their preferential access 
to the EU if they do not sign an EPA and revert to the GSP, the value of preferences under 
Cotonou amounted to only 3.9 percent of their exports to the EU or EUR 782 million in 
2005.
4 The value of EU preferences for African LDCs is less at 2.1 percent of total 
exports.
5 The appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the value of EU preferences 
under Cotonou and the GSP. 
 
Third, for products where margins of preference have been substantial, such as clothing, 
market access has been severely limited by restrictive rules of origin imposed by the EU. 
Figure 5 shows that prior to the end of the ATC, exports of apparel from African least 
developed countries (LDCs) to the EU stagnated despite preferences, whilst exports to the 
US under AGOA grew very strongly. Exports of apparel from African LDCs to the EU and 
US were almost equal in 2000, but the value of exports to the US in 2004 was almost four 
times greater than the value of exports to the EU.  
                                                 
4 Under the GSP the value of their preferences would fall to to 0.5 percent of their exports or EUR 103 
million, a loss of EUR 679.  
5 The value of EBA preferences for all LDCs equals 3.8 percent of their exports. The value of ACP/GSP 
preferences for all African countries (excluding South Africa) equals 2.6 (3.3) percent of their respective 
exports. South Africa accounts for about a third of all SSA exports to the EU. 
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Figure 3: Non-restrictive rules of origin strongly stimulated US imports of apparel 
from African LDCs; but EU imports stagnated in the face of strict rules
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Source: USITC and Eurostat 
 
The key factor explaining why exports to the US grew much faster than to the EU is the 
rules of origin. EU rules stipulate production from yarn. This entails that a double 
transformation process must take place in the beneficiary with the yarn being woven into 
fabric and then the fabric cut and made-up into apparel. These rules prohibit the use of 
imported fabric, although cumulation provisions allow for the use of inputs produced in 
other ACP countries. To obtain preferences, apparel producers must use local, EU or ACP 
fabrics.  They may not use fabrics from the main fabric-producing countries in Asia and 
still qualify for EU preferences—a binding restriction, since few countries in Africa have 
competitive fabric industries. The EU rules do not allow producers in African LDCs the 
flexibility they currently have under AGOA to source fabrics globally. It is worth 
remembering that the EU has granted preferences to African countries for apparel subject 
to these strict rules of origin for more than 20 years under the Lome and then Cotonou 
agreements. However, these strict rules have done little to encourage the development of 
an efficient fabric industry in Africa, the main justification for their imposition,
6 and are 
likely to have severely constrained the impact of preferences in stimulating the clothing 
industry.
7 This is in particular because a competitive clothing sector is the most important 
driver for a local textile industry because the demand for short lead times will create 
pressure to source locally. At the same time, the lack of regional infrastructure and market 
size for textile products have hindered the exploitation of economies of scale and scope in 
competitively producing high quality textiles and specialized textile products. 
                                                 
6 See Brenton (2006) for a discussion of why restrictive rules of origin are inappropriate as a development 
tool and are more likely to reflect protectionist interests in the preference granting country. 
7 See Brenton and Ozden (2005) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of the EBA and AGOA on apparel 
exports from African LDCs and the role of the rules of origin.  
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Opportunities and Challenges in the Changing Global Economy 
The negotiation of EPAs is taking place in a rapidly changing world economy. EPAs will 
be successful if they leverage the reforms and supporting aid for trade that are essential if  
ACP countries are to exploit the opportunities that are available to them in the global 
economy whilst effectively addressing the challenges that come from an increasingly 
competitive global economy. Concentrating on locking-in preference dependent trade with 
the EU will not be a recipe for success. This section briefly discusses the emerging 
opportunities for ACP countries in the world economy, with a focus on Africa. It 
highlights the growing importance of east Asia in the global economy and the surge in 
trade in services that has accompanied declining telecommunications costs. 
 
The rising importance of developing countries in the global economy 
The pace of global integration is likely to intensify and will be powered increasingly by 
developing countries. World Bank (2006) suggests that the size of the global economy will 
rise from $35 trillion in 2005 to $75 trillion (at constant market exchange rates and prices) 
in 2030, an average annual increase of more than 3 percent—2.5 percent for high-income 
countries and 4.2 percent for developing countries. Developing countries, once considered 
the periphery of the global economy, will become main drivers. The share of developing 
countries in global output will increase steadily and China’s output will exceed that of the 
European Union and that of the United States sometime around 2015 (in purchasing power 
parity terms). Global integration is likely to enter a new phase. In virtually every growing 
economy the importance of trade—captured by the ratio of trade to GDP—will rise, 
continuing the trend of the past two decades.  
 
Global trade in goods and services, growing faster than output, is likely to rise more than 
threefold to $27 trillion in 2030. Roughly half that increase will come through developing 
countries, with the share of developing countries in global exports rising from 32 percent 
now to 45 percent in 2030 (Figure 4). This means that a growing share of global 
production of goods and services will be performed in those developing countries able to 
take advantage of new opportunities and respond to the emerging challenges. Whether 
countries exceed projections—or fall short—depends heavily on the policies they adopt 
over this long period.  
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The new wave of globalisation brings important challenges for developing countries. 
Developing countries with wages higher than those in China and India risk losing ground 
following the entry of these countries into the global marketplace. The sheer size of China 
and India may also preclude the diversification of the poorest countries into manufactures 
and so close of a route to growth and development (Cline (2006)). However, what matters 
is productivity. In middle income countries is the wage gap with China greater than the 
difference in productivity and can productivity differentials be maintained? Similarly, least 
developed countries in Africa that have lower wages than China and India, will be able to 
compete in the global market if levels of productivity are close to those in India and China.  
 
Another problem with the view that the global market will be swamped by products from 
China and India is that the law of comparative advantage entails that there will always be 
opportunities for other countries to export even though India and China will come to 
dominate certain sectors. In general, as the global demand for say Chinese manufactured 
products increases, (dollar denominated) wages in China will tend to increase, through 
higher wage demands from Chinese workers (especially if the rural and urban labor 
markets remain partially segmented) and from the inevitable additional pressure on the 
Yuan to rise. There is evidence that this process has already begun (Figure 5) 
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 Thus, Chinese development will not preclude the lowest income countries being able to 
export low skilled intensive products. However, this will only arise if these countries put in 
place a business climate that supports investment and trade. For example, in Africa, 
competitiveness from low cost labor is undermined by high indirect costs, with the main 
barriers being corruption, crime and inadequate infrastructure (Eifert et al 2005). The poor 
business environment leads to lower returns to labor and capital in production which 
depresses investment, labor demand and real wages.  
 
The entry of these large economic entities into the global market offers opportunities as 
enormous as the challenges posed for developing countries. The large markets in India and 
China have changed the dynamic of south-south trade (Figure 6) and offer developing 
countries a route to decreased dependence on rich countries, demand in which for products 
produced in the poorest countries has been growing slowly for a long period.  
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Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 21
st century, African countries still ship nearly two 
thirds of their total exports to EU and the US. There has been, however, a recent shift in 
export patterns. Demand in Asia, and primarily in India and China, has been the main 
source of the accelerated growth of African exports since 1990 and the growth of such 
exports has intensified in the 2000s (Broadman (2007)).  
 
In table 1 we show, using a very simple simulation based on the gravity model and 
scenarios of growth in the different regions drawn from Global Economic Prospects 2007, 
that the importance of China and other East Asian countries as a destination for Africa’s 
exports should increase substantially over the next 25 years
8. The main adjustment that 
takes place is a shift away from Europe. If bilateral trade flows continue to be driven by 
incomes and location then Europe will cease to be the largest destination market for SSA 
exports. Exports to the EU market will remain critical for many exporters and important 
new markets and niches will clearly arise. However, if EPAs are narrowly focused on 
bilateral trade between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa and fail to address the key 
constraints to global competitiveness then they will fail to assist the ACP countries in 
exploiting these new opportunities in the global market.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The growth rates for each region are based on simple projections of average performance over the past 15  
years. The approach is based on simply applying the coefficients on exporter and importer GDP from a 
standard gravity model to the changes in income over the next 25 years.  
  10Table 1: Destination of Sub-Saharan (non-oil) Exports 
Destination 2004 2030
18.3% 31.3% Asia   
8.2% 8.6% Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
53.3% 38.7% European Union 
8.0% 5.7% The Americas 
6.2% 4.3%         o.w. USA 
0.3% 0.2%         o.w. Brazil 
2.0% 2.5% Middle East, North Africa 
0.3% 0.2% Oceania 
9.9% 12.9% Sub-Saharan Africa 
100.0% 100.0% Total 
source: Linkage model, COMTRADE, own calculations; non-oil trade only 
 
Opportunities from the Global Sourcing of Services 
The global competition that has been underway in goods for decades is now visible in 
services, as falling telecommunications costs and greater openness to FDI enable different 
parts of the services value chain to be performed in different locations around the globe—
global sourcing of services.  Global sourcing has increased competition in services markets 
for a wide variety of activities, from low-skilled such as data entry, word processing and 
call centers to higher skilled activities such as software development, consultancy, medical 
services and R&D. A range of services that were previously thought to be non-tradable are 
now being provided electronically over large distances. The potential number of service 
jobs that may migrate from rich to poor countries is uncertain but could be large (World 
Bank (2006)). 
 
This phenomenon is creating considerable opportunities for development in poor low wage 
countries, both in terms of export possibilities as well as access through imports to cheaper 
services inputs that raise productivity when used in other sectors. Global sourcing is 
providing important new employment. In the relatively low-value segments such as call 
centers, wage costs are important determinants of location (along with language skills) and 
competition is fierce among developing countries. At the higher skill end, global sourcing 
of services may be reducing incentives for skilled migration by creating new opportunities 
at home. It is also important to note that a large number of those employed as a result of 
global sourcing are women, offering a different route to development than that based on 
growth of agriculture and manufacturing. 
 
The services revolution and global sourcing are offering opportunities for new exports and 
for attracting services-related foreign investment for a range of poor countries. IT and 
global sourcing offer new and alternative drivers of development that circumvent some of 
the key constraints to growth driven by the expansion of exports of agricultural and 
manufactured goods. This is most apparent for landlocked countries and small (often 
island) economies that face very high costs for physical transportation (by air, road and 
sea). For example, development in Rwanda has to confront an extremely adverse location, 
one of the highest population densities and a high population growth rate. While increasing 
the quality of quantity of exports of traditional agricultural exports (coffee) and minerals is 
crucial to increases in incomes for the poor in the short to medium term, the government of 
  11Rwanda has identified the provision of IT intensive services, both locally and abroad, as a 
base for growth in the long run, to provide for employment and to turn the country’s high, 
but very young, population into a driver of development rather than a constraint. While 
India and China will come to dominate the market for global sourcing of services, 
comparative advantage will ensure that there are opportunities for many developing 
countries. Small island economies in the Caribbean, for example, have been able to attract 
certain back office activities from the United States, such as data entry.  
 
While there are important new opportunities for developing countries there are also 
considerable challenges regarding the provision of necessary infrastructure, the design and 
implementation of appropriate regulation and effective education strategies to increase the 
supply of human capital. While telecommunications infrastructure is clearly crucial, access 
to relatively cheap and reliable electricity is also necessary (a critical problem for many 
poor countries). Providing access to high-quality telecommunications infrastructure is not 
sufficient. It is also necessary to establish a competitive framework for the provision of 
telecommunications services. Liberalization of the trade and investment regime can be 
central to ensuring the efficient and competitive provision of the backbone 
telecommunications services complemented by an appropriate and effective regulatory 
environment. Considering the difficulties in establishing such a framework, it is in this 
sector that Aid for Trade and technical assistance, similar to the concept of “twinning”, are 
needed. This concept has been used very successfully in EU accession countries where 
administrations and agencies of member and accession countries exchanged personnel to 
transfer knowledge and procedures. 
 
Competitiveness Reform Programs and EPAs 
It is important that developing countries put in place strategies that enable them to exploit 
the opportunities that global integration offers to raise and sustain rates of growth. This 
calls for more attention to policies that facilitate trade and improve competitiveness – 
supported where necessary by Aid for Trade. In this context it is useful to have a 
framework in which to assess the range of issues that affect countries’ ability to compete in 
international markets. There are three critical complementary elements: 
 
1. The incentives regime. A key challenge for policy makers is to ensure that domestic 
resources are channeled to their most productive activities. This requires a careful analysis 
of the structure of incentives in the economy to ensure that land, labour, capital and 
technology are moving to a) sectors in which the country has a long-term capacity to 
compete and b) to the most productive firms within sectors. In turn, this necessitates a clear 
understanding of how trade, tax, the business environment and labour market policies 
interact to affect investment, output and trade decisions. In many small low income 
countries the economy tends to be dominated by a small number of sectors so that many of 
the key issues regarding the allocation of resources can be unearthed by analysis that 
focuses on these sectors. This method, however, is likely to miss growth potential in 
sectors that are only on the verge of becoming successful as they do not figure in the policy 
makers’ mindsets. There would hence be a bias towards already established sectors, 
missing the potentially large growth potential in non-traditional sectors. 
 
  122. Lowering the costs of backbone services. Of great importance in today’s globalised 
economy is that domestic firms have access to efficiently produced critical backbone 
services inputs. Firms that have to pay more than their competitors for energy, 
telecommunications, customs services, transport and logistics, finance and security will 
find it hard to compete in both the domestic and overseas markets. Competition and 
regulatory oversight in these services industries lie at the heart of the policy challenge. In 
many developing countries lack of infrastructure is a critical constraint on the availability 
and cost of backbone services. Other critical services are those related to education and 
training that are necessary to ensure supply of the type of labour required by the more 
productive expanding sectors in the economy and to foster a process by which value is 
increasingly added to the products and services produced in the country. 
 
3. Pro-active policies to support trade. It is important to address a range of market and 
government failures that tend to afflict countries as they seek to expand exports and 
growth. In many cases these constraints to competitiveness require specific interventions 
and institutions. These are likely to include export and investment promotion agencies, 
standards bodies, agencies to support innovation and clustering. Pro-active policies that 
increase competitiveness would also include an increasingly flexible labor market. To 
obtain the necessary political support, governments should focus on protecting workers 
instead of protecting jobs. This means that effective safety nets for those workers losing 
their jobs due to increased competition should be put in place. In tackling government 
failures and weak capacity for policy formulation and implementation, an effective 
mechanism can be to establish an empowered and dedicated trade and competitiveness 
policy unit within government that brings together stakeholders and coordinates policies on 
export processing zones, duty refund schemes, and other initiatives. It is important that 
these initiatives are brought together within a strategy for competitiveness rather than as a 
series of ad hoc interventions. In isolation these agencies tend to be rather weak and 
ineffective, and by potentially duplicating efforts will most likely waste scarce skilled 
resources. 
 
The role of EPAs  
To improve the competitiveness of the economy, countries will have to go ahead with 
substantial domestic reforms. But because many of the ACP countries are small in 
population and economic size and/or are landlocked, some of the issues listed are best 
addressed at the regional level. This is where EPAs can play an important role by 
committing countries to, strengthening, and moving forward the process of regional 
integration which will allow to solve those problems that need a regional solution. Well-
designed EPAs can offer an opportunity to harness the power of trade negotiations to 
further internal regional development and spur integration into the global economy as well 
as improving access to the EU market and leveraging aid for trade to support reform 
programmes. In contrast, a poorly designed EPA that would not foster regional integration 
could seriously undermine development. Box 1 suggests and summarizes key elements of a 
pro-development EPA. The following section elaborates on how EPAs can support reform 
in the three areas that are crucial for global competitiveness.  
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The incentive regime 
Domestic incentives: Reducing the dispersion and then the level of tariffs will be a critical 
element of a competitiveness strategy in many of the ACP countries as it will correct 
distortions in the incentive regime. The reduction of external tariffs is also necessary in an 
EPA to avoid potentially damaging trade diversion. Trade liberalization in the EPA regions 
should be a staged process with intra regional barriers removed first. Considering the 
delays in agreeing on the form of customs unions, governments should consider 
establishing well functioning FTAs as soon as possible first, and to continue working 
towards customs unions subsequently, instead of postponing significant advancements in 
regional integration by devoting too much energy to negotiations of common external 
tariffs.  
 
In this context, MFN peak tariffs should quickly be capped at the regional level and in a 
coordinated manner to remove the largest distortions in domestic markets. In the same 
coordinated manner, but not necessarily under a CET, average MFN tariffs should be 
lowered to pursue global competitiveness and integration into global market. Lower tariffs 
will contribute to an improved incentive regime that allows domestic firms access to 
needed inputs at world market prices and which avoids bias against exports and the 
bottling up of resources into low productivity activities.  Subsequently, tariffs against 
imports from the EU could be removed under an EPA. It is essential that preferences for 
EU suppliers are only implemented after the reduction of MFN tariffs since lack of 
competition among EU suppliers in small ACP markets could lead to unchanged prices and 
simply to a transfer of revenue from the customs authority in the ACP country to EU 
suppliers.  
 
Incentives in export markets: At the same time, EPAs can offer ACP countries two 
important improvements in market access, more favorable rules of origin and certainty of 
access. EPAs can also offer larger market access to non-LDC ACP countries as coverage 
of the GSP scheme is not as generous as current Cotonou preferences. Current product 
specific EU rules of origin are highly restrictive, especially for those products in which 
African countries have potential to expand exports of non-traditional products; clothing, 
fishing and processed foods. The EU has long posited that restrictive rules of origin should 
lead to industrial development and integration in beneficiary countries. More than 20 years 
of restrictive rules of origin, however, have not induced integrated industrial developments 
in ACP countries and have not contributed to a more dynamic export performance.  
Restrictive rules of origin have not led to the emergence of an efficient ACP-wide textile 
industry even though ACP cotton producers exist. The penalty on using local (more 
expensive or low quality) inputs often exceeds the expected benefits from using EU 
preferences. The small market size of most ACP countries makes vertical integration a less 
profitable option. Rules of origin have proven to be a highly distortive and grossly 
ineffective instrument for achieving integrated industrial development.  Thus, exports from 
Africa to the EU would be stimulated by a requirement to satisfy either a simple 10 percent 
value added criteria as proposed by the Blair commission report or a change of tariff 
classification. 
 
  14Under an EPA, certainty of access would be assured in a way that voluntary preferences 
under the EBA and the positive lists enrollment in GSP do not permit.  EBA preferences, 
though unlikely, can be withdrawn.  GSP is subject to review and withdrawal, and since it 
is awarded on a positive list basis, its support for diversification is much less.   
 
Due to the limited additional gain that LDCs can expect from an EPA with regard to 
preferential access in goods (except certainty and less restrictive rules of origin), EPAs 
should also contain a program, however small, of temporary movement of persons (mode 
4). Preferential access of workers to the EU market from these countries could lead to 
increased incentives to invest in education and larger transfers of knowledge when workers 
return to their origin countries after temporarily working in the EU. In case the EC will not 
be able to obtain the mandate to include temporary movement in the negotiations, one 
could consider additional side-agreements between ACP countries and EU member states. 
 
 
Lowering the costs of backbone services and trading 
Trade-related services throughout Africa are less efficient than in other regions. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, 52 percent of firms report unreliable electricity supply as a constraint. This 
compares to 42 percent in South Asia and 24 percent in East Asia and Latin America 
(World Development Report 2005) The DTIS’s for a number of countries highlight that 
electricity, telecommunications, transport, and water charges are often higher in low-
income countries and that access to these and other services, such as financial services, are 
extremely limited. Access to telephone services remains low with the number of mobile 
phone subscribers varying strongly between countries and averaging 58 per 1000 
inhabitants in 2002 (ranging from 0.2 in Niger to 447 on the Seychelles). 
 
Regional integration can help overcome these problems. The domestic markets of many 
ACP countries are too small to realize full economies of scale in network services and their 
regulation. In addition, regional approaches can led to regulatory frameworks that allow for 
greater competition, with positive effects on prices and efficiency. EPAs offer the 
opportunity to bring all relevant stakeholders together and to lock in domestic reforms and 
regional integration with regard to the regulation and supply of crucial telecommunication, 
electricity, water, and financial services needed for exporting. Regional integration in this 
field should be coupled with phased programs of services liberalization on an MFN basis 
to avoid the enlargement and entrenchment of existing monopolies or their transfer to EU 
suppliers. ACP countries have to keep in mind that the importance of having efficient 
services as inputs into final goods and services production most likely exceeds the 
employment effects directly related to the service providers.  
 
With regard to trade facilitation, a regional approach also promises to be most effective. 
This refers to both external borders and addressing the large barriers that land-locked 
countries face when they have to transit their goods through neighboring countries. To 
overcome problems of coordination, harmonization of documentation and regulations, 
regional strategies are likely to be more effective than domestic policies. Again, aid for 
trade will be needed to address the large investment demands that will address problems in 
regional infrastructure networks within each EAP region. 
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Reforms that will increase access to crucial backbone services should also aim at setting up 
of simple but functioning, region-wide, competition authorities. Linking EPAs to small but 
firm commitments on establishing a supra-national competition policy within each EPA 
region could help to advance policy reforms. Due to the extensive experience of the EU 
with the establishment of a supra-national competition policy, the EU should consider 
offering aid for trade in this area, in particular in the form of technical assistance and 
twinning.  
 
 
Pro-active policies to support trade 
While integrating into the world economy requires that import taxes are low and relatively 
uniform, for the least developed countries they are a key source of revenue relative to VAT 
and sales taxes (Figure 7). High-income countries are able to recover revenues lost from 
trade liberalization from other sources: on average, middle income countries recover 45-60 
percent of lost tariff revenues while least developed countries recover less than 30 percent 
Source: Bank staff calculations 
of lost tariff revenues (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005). 
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suggest, due to the widespread (discretionary) granting of exemptions. Preliminary 
analysis of data for certain ESA countries suggests that a large share of statutory cus
revenues is not collected and that these exemptions tend to be more prevalent for imports 
from the EU, such that the revenue impact of tariff reform vis-à-vis the EU will be much 
less than would be expected on the basis of statutory tariff rates. At the same time, cappin
prohibitive tariffs at an MFN basis could lead to increased imports of these goods which 
would increase revenue collection. Exemptions make the tax regime opaque and difficult 
to administer and can lead to a distorted incentive structure that discriminates against smal
firms with less influence. Further, there is little evidence that exemptions have a significant 
impact on investment, their primary justification. Many countries could substantially 
reduce applied tariffs while maintaining or even increasing revenue if exemptions wer
  16removed and collection improved. However, it is still necessary to address the 
development challenge highlighted in Figure 7 of moving from easy-to-collect 
to harder-to-collect consumption and income taxes. Simply implementing a VAT is not 
sufficient; a high degree of collection efficiency (the ratio of actual to potential revenues
is needed.  
 
trade taxes 
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o meet this development challenge and obtain the necessary funds to finance relevant 
l be 
ved 
iff 
ddressing the revenue implications of tariff reform will also be important as economic 
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ast, the continuing prevalence of substantial non-tariff barriers between countries of the 
T
projects requires an increase in the tax base for the “difficult to collect taxes” which wil
achieved through economic growth, simplification, in terms of fewer rates and less 
exemptions, an increase size of formal relative to informal sector and through impro
revenue collection. A key objective for many of the ACP countries is customs reform to 
increase the efficiency of collection of taxes applied at the border. This in turn requires 
initiatives to raise the capacity of customs.  Regional reform and harmonization of tax 
administration and structures will promote regional integration and help replace lost tar
revenue. It will furthermore simplify and streamline the regional incentive regime if done 
properly.  
 
A
reforms will create high financing demands. For example, making labor markets more 
flexible will be an important element to increase global competitiveness. Governments 
ACP countries, however, will have to overcome domestic resistance to such reforms and 
should do so by changing the focus from protecting jobs to protecting workers, demanding
substantial financial means. Allowing more labor movements within EPA groupings could 
help in making labor markets function more effectively. 
 
L
same regional block also calls for region-wide approaches to remove these barriers. EPAs 
could help to commit to these reforms.  
 
Box 1: Elements of a Pro-Development EPA 
 
What does a pro-development EPA look like?  Here are 8 elements that would collectively constitute 
central tenants of a pro-development EPA.  A guiding principle of these measures is that all 8 are in the 
fundamental interest of all countries as part of their development strategies—and of the EU in its 
objective of promoting development.  These would include: 
 
1.  A program of phased and variable geometry for MFN reductions in external tariffs, consistent with 
regional development programs.  For example: 
Phases 1 and 2: Eliminate all internal tariff barriers in CU/FTA to promote regional trade.  
  Phases 1 and 2: Bring down MFN peak tariffs to average to promote intra-African and other 
efficient trade with third parties.  
   average levels toward East Asian levels in EPA group.  Phases 2 and 3: Bring down MFN
Phase 3:  Allow preferential for the EU; taken as a final step, the adverse risks of trade   
  diversion and hub-and-spokes development would be lessened. 
 
2.  Nonrestrictive rules of origin for ACP access to the EU market (choice of satisfying either a 10% 
value-added requirement or change of tariff heading); if the value-added requirement is higher, 
cumulation should cover all developing countries to allow ACP producers maximum access to the 
  17world’s lowest-cost inputs and to avoid putting regional suppliers outside the EPA group at a 
disadvantage.  
 
3.  A program of gradual but purposeful reforms of tax administration and intra-regional tax policy to 
harmonize tax structures so as to promote regional integration and replace lost tariff revenues.  This 
can complement tariff and customs reforms at the regional level.  
 
4.  A phased, region-specific program of services liberalization designed to promote wider access to 
lower cost trade-related services, such as efficient telecommunications, electricity, and transport; 
this should be undertaken on an MFN basis, so as to avoid entrenching monopolies from one or 
another country. 
 
5.  A program of trade facilitation measures—for example, improvements in customs, ports, border 
posts -- to reduce costs, linked to intra-regional programs to lower costs of trading, with special 
attention to lowering transit costs of land-locked countries, with specific benchmarks for 
implementation;  
 
6.  A program, however small, of temporary movement of persons (mode 4); while not currently in the 
negotiations, this may be easier to achieve in regional arrangements than in multilateral talks.   
 
7.  Agreements could include new IPR rules and rules on investment, but these should be back-loaded 
and phased in accordance to a region’s capacity to implement – and to benefit from them.  
Agreements could include adoption of competition policies consistent with national development 
strategies and in accordance with a region’s capacity to implement and benefit from them.  
 
8.  “Aid for trade” in the form of a program of technical and financial assistance to support 
competitiveness reform programs through funding projects that improve trade facilitation, SPS, and 
alleviate supply side constraints (e.g., infrastructure) as well as funding programs that address the 
adjustment costs that arise from trade reform.   
 
Derived from Hinkle, Hoppe, and Newfarmer (2005) 
 
Conclusions 
Both the EU and the ACP countries will have to work hard to achieve pro-development 
EPAs. Time is short and much remains to be done. Key issues must be addressed to avoid 
the risks that come from a badly designed agreement. Because tariffs are relatively high 
and internal barriers within groupings still prevalent, enacting EPAs without prior action 
on these issues could result in a hub and spoke pattern of trade integration, trade diversion, 
and the possibility of net losses of income. Without action on external and internal barriers, 
giving EU firms preferential access to their markets could well divert trade to EU-
producers from more efficient producers based in the rest of the world and even from those 
based in the regional grouping if the internal non-tariff barriers exceed the external tariff. 
As a result, trade liberalization vis-à-vis the EU might not lead to lower consumer prices 
but rather to a transfer of tariff revenue to EU producers. This problem is aggravated by the 
fact that many national markets in Africa are small and transport costs to these markets can 
be high. Markets are often monopolized by one external supplier and competition among 
EU producers is not likely to increase after the implementation of the EPAs. Thus, an EPA 
focused on preferential tariff removal for EU suppliers that is implemented in the absence 
of a strategy to raise competitiveness in Africa through reductions in internal and external 
barriers to trade, attention to supply side constraints such as lack of infrastructure, and 
  18active policies to support trade and address trade related adjustment costs, will likely 
undermine development.  
 
To achieve pro-development EPAs, the EU has to be willing to provide greater market 
access through nonrestrictive rules of origin, to defer its own preferences in ACP markets 
until important MFN liberalization has occurred in the regions and to support ACP 
countries implement their reform programs through “aid for trade”.  The ACP countries 
will have to work hard to develop regional strategies for integration that harness the 
potential power of the EPA process to move forward on reforms that will promote their 
competitiveness, integration, and growth and be willing to lock-in a program of 
implementation consistent with its own development priorities and pace of reform.   
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  20Appendix  
The current value of preferences in the EU market 
How important are the trade preferences that African countries’ consider the trade 
preferences they enjoy as important for their exports to the EU. But current EU trade 
preferences for the 13 non-LDCs in Africa amounted to only 3.9 percent of their exports to 
the EU or EUR 782 million in 2005.
9 The value of preferences for all African LDCs is 
much less with 2.1 percent of total exports but is less relevant in this discussion as these 
countries have access to the EBA which will continue to secure them duty and quota free 
access to the EU market, even though under the more restrictive rules of origin of the GSP 
(EBA is a special form of GSP).
10
 
One of the problems that one faces when talking about the value of preferences is that this 
is an artificial concept. The value of preferences is the amount of import duties that 
exporters did not pay because of preferential tariff rates; it is the volume of trade 
multiplied by the difference between MFN and preferential tariffs, taking utilization rates 
into account. Its calculation is based on actually observed trade flows and omits the fact 
that some of these trade flows might only take place because of the preferences. In that 
case, the whole export value would be additional value that is transferred to the exporter 
because preferences are granted. 
 
At the same time, the data do not allow us to identify the economic agents that actually 
benefit from the preferential rates. The issue is that tariffs create a wedge between the 
producer price in the exporting country (including transport costs to the export market) and 
the consumer price in the importing country. Here, we assume that the exporter actually 
benefits as he continues to sell the goods in the destination market for the higher consumer 
price but does not have to pay the import duties. He hence receives a net transfer of the 
value of preferences. Depending on the market power of the importer, the exporter, or an 
intermediary, it could be also be the importer or the intermediary who benefit from the 
reduction in tariff rates. If market power of the importer is high, he can continue to pay the 
producer price to the exporter (keeping his income constant as compared to the situation 
without trade preferences) but sell at the higher consumer price in the importing country, 
keeping the difference in price as a profit. Similarly, the intermediary could benefit from 
the lower tariff rate by buying from the producer at producer prices and selling to the final 
reseller at consumer prices. In this situation, the intermediaries income increases while 
both income for the exporter and final importer stay constant (as compared to the situation 
without tariff preferences).The ‘value of preferences’ is hence a high estimate for the value 
that is transferred to the exporting country given the observed trade patterns (Olarreaga and 
Ozden 2005).  
 
                                                 
9 We use a new dataset the EU has recently made available. Assuming that Cotonou preferences expire and 
no new preferences will be in place by that time, 2008, it is possible that these countries would only have 
access to preferences under the GSP. Other things equal, this would reduce the value of their preferences to 
0.5 percent of their exports or EUR 103 million, a loss of EUR 679.  
10 The value of EBA preferences for all LDCs equals 3.8 percent of their exports. The value of ACP/GSP 
preferences for all African countries (excluding South Africa) equals 2.6 (3.3) percent of their respective 
exports. South Africa accounts for about a third of all SSA exports to the EU. 
  21Given the increasing dominance of large supermarket chains it is probably fair to assume 
that at least a large share of the preferences will accrue to the importers as these will rather 
have monopsony power than small producers in developing countries having some kind of 
monopoly poser (see also Cling xxx for an example in Mauritius). The question then 
remains whether the margin of preferences actually creates trade relationships that 
otherwise would not have taken place. This more global value of preferences is impossible 
to estimate without specific knowledge of export prices from a larger number of suppliers 
and the final sales prices.  
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11 Overall, actually claimed preferences for all 13 sub-Saharan non-LDCs  represent 3.9 
percent of their exports to the EU. If only GSP preferences were available, this value 
would fall to 0.5 percent of total exports or EUR 103 million, a loss of EUR 679. The fall 
would be substantial for all countries but particularly high in the case of Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, and Swaziland where the value of preferences would fall from about 23, 16, 
                                                 
11 South Africa is not included in the analysis as it is only an ACP country since 1998 and is not a signatory 
to the commercial provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, which foresees the negotiation of EPAs. While 
South Africa has signed an FTA with the EU in 1999, its partners in the customs union (SACU) are supposed 
to sign an EPA. Both arrangements are likely to create barriers within SACU. South Africa has expressed 
interest to join the SADC EPA but this has been rejected by the EU.  
  22and 50 percent respectively to nearly zero. Alternatively, if EPAs with Cotonou-type rules 
of origin were to be in place by 2008, the value of preferences could increase to 4.5 percent 
of exports, a notional gain of EUR 107 million.
12 If EPAs were concluded with very 
simple rules of origin, however, preferences could be much higher because this could make 
a number of export products competitive in the European market. For example, less 
restrictive rules of origin for apparel products in the US under AGOA have led to an 
increase in clothing exports from about USD 250 million in 2000 to more than USD 800 
million in 2004.  
 
The actual value of preferences under an EPA, however, would depend on the rules of 
origin that were to be agreed. While the 4.5 percent figure assumes identical utilization 
rates as under the current regime, inclusion of non-restrictive rules of origin in EPAs could 
increase that value to 5.2 percent assuming constant trade flows. It would, however, be 
likely that non-restrictive rules of origin such as the 10% value-added rule proposed by the 
Blair commission or a simple change of tariff heading rule would open a range of new 
export opportunities for beneficiary countries, increasing the value of preferences. It is 
very difficult to estimate the potential value of these changes in competitiveness, however, 
but they could potentially be very large.  
 
The importance of preferences also differs strongly by country, mainly due to differences 
in the composition of exports to the EU. For example, the ratio of actually claimed 
preferences to exports ranges from 0.1 percent for Nigeria, which mainly exports oil to the 
EU, to 49.5 percent for Swaziland that mainly exports sugar to the EU which benefits from 
large preferences (see figure 1). While the importance of preferences as a share of exports 
varies between countries, more detailed analysis shows preferences are usually 
concentrated in a few products, indicating that they have only opened up certain sectors 
(where MFN protection is high). These products are in particular sugar (36 percent of 
preference value), edible fruits and nuts (12 percent), and preparations of meat, fish or 
crustaceans (12 percent).  
 
Continuing multilateral liberalization in the Doha round is likely that MFN tariffs will be 
reduced further. While this will be desirable as barriers to other large and growing markets 
will be reduced, it will also mean that the value of preferences of exports to the EU will 
decrease because of shrinking preferential margins. In those cases where preferential tariffs 
are zero, the value of preferences will approximately decline in line with MFN reductions. 
Where preferential tariffs are larger than zero, the value of preferences will decrease 
stronger (or completely disappear). A rule of thumb puts the costs of proving rules of 
origin at three percent of the goods value. If one deducts these costs from the value of 
preferences calculated, the value of preferences will be even smaller. With falling 
preferential margins, this margin might fall below three percent in many cases, making 
usage of preferences no longer worthwhile. 
 
                                                 
12 The value of preferences under the EBA initiative would change significantly, showing the limited 
additional coverage that EBA preferences offer over Cotonou preferences 
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